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Several years ago, I attended a faculty meeting where an item on our 
agenda called for some special treatment or consideration (I forget what 
it might have been) for a public interest initiative at the school. A veteran 
tenured colleague, a prominent scholar who published important work, 
questioned us about what warranted the “public interest” designation for 
this activist measure. He wrote law review articles that influenced pub-
lic policy, he argued, so wasn’t his work just as entitled to be considered 
“public interest” as the initiative in question?
I knew that he simply had to be wrong (although I did not say anything 
at the time), but his argument has stayed with me over all of the inter-
vening years.1 His curiosity about what “counts” as public interest is not 
frivolous, and it resembles the question presented in this discussion about 
what counts as “justice” in community-based transactional work. As I seek 
to explain in this brief overview, sometimes community economic develop-
ment (CED), and the related transactional practice, will serve the needs of 
justice, and at other times it probably does not. For those critics who worry 
1. While my colleague’s question may not represent a serious internal debate on law 
school campuses touting their public interest commitments, variations of that question 
have led to intriguing definitional uncertainties among scholars. As Susan Carle has 
written,
Today, people use the term “public interest” law as a gloss for a wide range of some-
times contradictory lawyering categories. Some people define “public interest” law 
as lawyering for the poor. Some define it as “cause” lawyering. Others think of it as 
lawyering specifically with a left wing or politically progressive agenda. Still others 
define the term as encompassing jobs in the public and nonprofit sectors.
Susan D. Carle, Re-Valuing Lawyering for Middle-Income Clients, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 719, 
729–30 (2001); see also Scott L. Cummings, The Pursuit of Legal Rights—and Beyond, 59 
UCLA L. Rev. 506, 517 (2012) (“[F]orty years after the invention of public interest law, 
we no longer have a working definition of what exactly it is.”); Deborah L. Rhode, Pub-
lic Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 2027, 2029 (2008) (“[There are 
no] rigorous, widely accepted criteria for determining what constitutes a ‘public interest’ 
legal organization . . . .”).
Clinical Professor and Dean’s Distinguished Scholar, Boston College Law School. I 
offer thanks to Ted De Barbieri and CJ Vachon for organizing the session at the AALS 
Annual Meeting in San Diego in January 2018.
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that, for instance, transactional clinics in law schools will diminish the tra-
ditional commitments of law schools to justice-driven education,2 there are 
encouraging responses.
I want to focus here on what I might call “retail”3 CED—transactional 
work performed for businesses or social enterprises that need it to survive 
or succeed. It seems to me that two related dimensions exist on which to 
assess the relationship between the transactional lawyering found in CED 
work and notions of social justice. First is the nature of the work itself: Does 
representing this client achieve a recognizable social- justice aim beyond 
what any lawyering at all, for any client, might achieve? Second is the tri-
age implication of the chosen work, aside from its individual quality. Given 
the needs of distressed and historically disadvantaged or overlooked com-
munities, is transactional CED work the best use of the lawyer’s services? 
In both instances, the answer will be “It depends,” and the interesting con-
sideration is what accounts for the difference. And, as we shall see, the two 
questions connect in important ways.
I. Transactional Lawyering and Access-to-Justice Goals
Imagine that a local nonprofit law firm has an opening for a new client, 
and the following three prospective clients4 have requested help:
Karen is a low-income, disabled victim of domestic violence whose control-
ling partner, Bill, through his lawyer, has filed a petition in family court for 
full custody of the couple’s six-year-old child. A motion for temporary cus-
tody has been scheduled for next week. Karen is 35 years old and white.
Gillian is a 25-year-old, white MBA student at a university, located in a 
nearby leafy suburb, which has built its reputation on fostering entrepre-
neurship. She has considerable educational debt. Her MBA curriculum 
includes encouragement for startup business development. Gillian has 
developed a web-based program that would facilitate sharing, Airbnb-style, 
of canoes, kayaks, sailboats, and motor craft. She needs help with corporate 
filings, trademark protection, liability concerns, and employment issues.
Soyoung lives with her family in a largely-Korean neighborhood of the 
local metropolitan area. Her parents are immigrants from Korea. She has 
started a business out of her home, catering functions with Korean cuisine. 
2. See, e�g�, Amber Baylor & Daria Fisher Page, Developing a Pedagogy of Beneficiary 
Accountability in the Representation of Social Justice Non-Profit Organizations, 45 Sw. L. Rev. 
825, 827 (2016) (“Notably, not all clinics representing organizational clients are engaged in 
social justice lawyering, particularly considering the rise of transactional clinics in recent 
years, many of which have eschewed a social justice mission . . . .”).
3. See David Wagner, The Quest for a Radical Profession: Social Science 
Careers and Political Ideology 195–210 (1990) (reporting discouragement among 
radical social workers in their efforts to adopt empowerment theories at the “retail level” 
with individual clients).
4. For the sake of this admittedly implausible thought experiment, I assume that the 
nonprofit firm has adequate expertise to address any one of the three client projects.
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The business could expand to a food truck, she hopes. Soyoung needs legal 
help with corporate organization, local permitting, liability protection, and 
trademark registration.
Each of these prospective clients has a significant need for legal help 
and cannot afford to obtain that help except through a program like this 
nonprofit firm. In choosing which client to accept, the firm no doubt will 
be concerned about the social justice implications of its selection. If it chose 
to offer its scarce and finite time to Karen, no observer would be surprised 
or criticize the agency. Indeed, one of the more prominent social policy 
endeavors in recent years has been the organized effort to craft systems 
to increase the availability of legal help to persons just like Karen. The 
accepted shorthand for the collective efforts is “access to justice.”5
By contrast, no one would plausibly argue that, of the three prospective 
clients, the agency should accept Gillian’s matter. Like Karen, Gillian has 
an array of legal needs, having access to a lawyer will matter, and she will 
not find a lawyer on the private market. And, if her web program succeeds, 
she will have contributed to the general economy, likely have added jobs 
and tax revenue, and satisfied a societal need. But there is no implication of 
justice in Gillian’s enterprise. Like with the public-interest definition debate 
referenced earlier,6 and my tenured colleague’s faculty meeting comment, 
while it is right and fair for Gillian to have support for her entrepreneur-
ship, the stakes for her not having a lawyer, by comparison to Karen, are 
simply not that significant.7
So, where does that leave Soyoung? Her legal needs resemble Gillian’s 
far more than they do Karen’s, and like Gillian the stakes are not nearly 
as dire. This simple thought experiment shows why observers question 
whether transactional legal services deserve to be included in the access-
to-justice conversation. Should available free lawyers turn down a client 
like Karen in order to offer services to small businesses like Gillian’s or 
Soyoung’s? It may be hard to imagine why.8
Of course, the answer is considerably more complicated. While no one 
would argue for Gillian, some will argue for Soyoung.9 For lawyers work-
 5. The civil Gideon movement, the recent “hackathon” innovations, and similar 
efforts to alleviate the shortage of affordable lawyers all aim to address the question in 
the text. I review those trends in a recent access-to-justice article. See Paul R. Tremblay, 
Surrogate Lawyering: Legal Guidance, sans Lawyers, 31 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 377 (2018).
 6. See note 1 supra.
 7. This analysis is true even if we assume, to make the story a tad more compelling, 
that Gillian cannot afford to use a resource like LegalZoom to achieve most of her results.
 8. For an elaborate examination of how progressive lawyers have historically chosen 
to allocate resources for social justice purposes, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Inner-City Anti-
Poverty Campaigns, 64 UCLA L. Rev. 1374 (2017).
 9. See, e�g�, Susan R. Jones, Promoting Social and Economic Justice Through Interdisciplin-
ary Work in Transactional Law, 14 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 249, 259 (2004); Lynnise E. Phillips 
Pantin, The Economic Justice Imperative for Transactional Law Clinics, 62 Vill. L. Rev. 175 
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ing at this retail level, there are good reasons to support entrepreneurs, 
and especially entrepreneurs of color, working in underserved communi-
ties seeking to make businesses succeed. Aiding a client like Karen helps 
in a short-term (if invaluable) way, but leaves her as short of power as 
before, and just as vulnerable.10 Aiding a client like Soyoung, by contrast, 
collaborates with a client in ways that support her power and autonomy 
growth. When the relationship ends she has less need for professional help 
than when it began (and she might be able to afford what she needs).11 
Respecting the limits of lawyer capacity to effect longer-term social change 
at the retail level,12 there are justifiable, persuasive reasons to offer those 
services to entrepreneurs whose missions might make a difference both to 
the founders themselves, and, more speculatively but if so valuably, to the 
neighborhoods in which they work. In this way, one can conclude that in 
this setting, transactional lawyering, as part of modest CED, represents a 
commitment to social justice. The choice to offer that service is a justified, 
justice-driven allocation of resources.
Before I move to the larger perspective on the lawyer’s role, I need to 
highlight one more important consideration for the retail triage choices 
made by the nonprofit agency among Karen, Gillian, and Soyoung. 
Thoughtful critics have argued, with impressive support, that for low-
wealth and historically disadvantaged community members, entrepre-
neurship is most often a false hope.13 Success is rare, and the absence of 
social, political, and (of course) financial capital makes the challenge all 
the greater.14 Better, the critics argue, for poverty lawyers and progres-
sive activists to support employment opportunities rather than startup 
businesses.
I know of no commentators who disagree with that discouraging empir-
ical analysis. Let us assume it is valid. The puzzle for street-level actors 
(2017); Joseph R. Pileri, Expanding Our Reach: Direct Client Representation vs� Policy and 
Advocacy Impact in a Transactional Clinic, 26 J. Affordable Hous. & Cmty. Dev. L. 325 
(2017).
10. See Paul R. Tremblay, Transactional Legal Services, Triage, and Access to Justice, 48 
Wash. U. J.L. & Soc. Pol’y 11 (2015).
11. See Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Strains in Transactional Lawyering for Underserved 
Entrepreneurs and Community Groups, 23 Clinical L. Rev. 311 (2016).
12. See Scott L. Cummings, Law and Social Movements: Reimagining the Progressive 
Canon, 2018 Wis. L. Rev. 441.
13. Rashmi Dyal-Chand & James V. Rowan, Developing Capabilities, Not Entrepreneurs: 
A New Theory for Community Economic Development, 42 Hofstra L. Rev. 839 (2014); Lou-
ise A. Howells, Dimension of Microenterprise: A Critical Look at Microenterprise as a Tool to 
Alleviate Poverty, 9 J. Affordable Hous. & Cmty. Dev. L. 161 (2000).
14. See Lynnise E. Phillips Pantin, The Wealth Gap and the Racial Disparities in the 
Startup Ecosystem, 62 St. Louis U. L.J. 419 (2018).
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like the lawyers here, making triage choices among the three prospective 
clients, is whether that empirical data ought to deprive Soyoung of the 
opportunity to try to succeed in this business at this time. It is hard to criti-
cize the agency for its support of Soyoung notwithstanding the odds.
II. Transactional Lawyering and Community-Building Goals
Let us accept for the moment the proposition that a local neighbor-
hood nonprofit offering retail legal services to residents with pressing legal 
needs can justifiably offer such services to entrepreneurs of color who have 
a reasonable shot at establishing a successful small for-profit business. Let 
us accept that, using the access-to-justice metric, such a choice is plausi-
bly defensible. We then encounter the powerful argument that asserts that 
we’re asking the wrong question from the beginning. Should the agency in 
question be operating at a retail level at all? Perhaps the agency should not 
only turn away Soyoung and Gillian, but Karen as well. Its mission ought 
to be different from individualized, bespoke legal services. It ought to be 
community-based and system-changing, and the triage choice from Part I 
is none of that.
Much of the most prominent CED literature operates at that level. From 
Scott Cummings’s early critiques of market-based CED15 and Sameer 
Ashar’s advocacy for community and movement lawyering16 to Michael 
Haber’s recent assessments of transactional lawyering,17 the message 
is clear: this kind of work “cannot seriously challenge the hegemony of 
liberal capitalism.”18 The emergence of demosprudence—“the study 
of the dynamic equilibrium of power between lawmaking and social 
movements”19—anchors serious rethinking of the role that lawyers play, 
and especially CED lawyers, in effecting social change, and advancing 
social justice. As Haber writes, consistent with many critical observers, 
“leading CED programs too often to fail to aggressively challenge the 
structural drivers of inequality.”20
15. See, e�g�, Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic Development as Progressive Poli-
tics: Toward a Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 399 (2001).
16. Sameer M. Ashar, Movement Lawyers in the Fight for Immigrant Rights, 64 UCLA L. 
Rev. 1464 (2017); Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95 
Calif. L. Rev. 1879 (2007) [hereinafter Ashar, Resistance Movements].
17. Michael Haber, CED After #OWS: From Community Economic Development to Anti-
Authoritarian Community Counter-Institutions, 43 Fordham Urb. L.J. 295 (2017).
18. Joel F. Handler, The Presidential Address, 1992: Postmodernism, Protest, and the New 
Social Movements, 26 L. & Soc’y Rev. 697, 719 (1992).
19. Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence of 
Law and Social Movements, 123 Yale L.J. 2740, 2749 (2014).
20. Haber, supra note 17, at 361.
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The debates among the CED critics and movement lawyers are rich and 
provocative,21 and we’d all agree—the critics are essentially right, aren’t 
they? The work that our fictional nonprofit agency might perform for 
Soyoung, or for Karen, will be what Gerald López describes as essentially 
regnant22 (although I have argued that the lawyering for Soyoung is less 
regnant than that for Karen23). It affects the larger community barely at 
all, and has questionable transformative benefit to the clients the agency 
chooses to serve. The puzzle, though, is what that reality means for lawyers 
like those offering retail representation to clients like Karen and Soyoung.
As long as lawyers continue to offer retail representation to individual 
clients in need, choices like that between Karen and Soyoung will persist. 
And while some critical scholarship implies that the street-level, single 
client lawyering model ought not to be an available model,24 most would 
likely agree that at a minimum a division of labor makes sense from a 
policy perspective, with both retail and movement/organizing work per-
formed by those who hope to advance social justice.25 As Alizabeth New-
man notes, the clients who are not yet aligned with mobilization campaigns 
have important legal needs that warrant attention from the legal services 
community.26
Once (or if) we accept the division of labor conception, and the real-
ity of retail legal practice, then we return to the access-to-justice question, 
with choices like those presented in the thought experiment that intro-
duced this essay. If we imagine a triage assessment—of the choice between 
Karen, who needs family law and domestic violence-related representation 
in court, and Soyoung, who has transactional legal needs that will help 
her emerging neighborhood-based business have a greater chance to suc-
ceed—applying the most helpful triage standards for allocation of scarce 
21. See, e�g�, Barbara Bezdek, Digging into Democracy: Reflections on CED and Social 
Change Lawyering After #OWS, 77 Md. L. Rev. Endnotes 16 (2018) (responding to Haber, 
supra note 17).
22. Gerald P. López, Rebellious Lawyering: One Chicano’s Vision of Progres-
sive Law Practice 25 (1992).
23. See Tremblay, supra note 11.
24. See, e�g�, Sameer M. Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 14 Clinical L. 
Rev. 355 (2008); Ashar, Resistance Movements, supra note 16; Ascanio Piomelli, Sensibilities 
for Social Justice Lawyers, 10 Hastings Race & Poverty L.J. 177, 190 (2013). The statement 
in the text overstates and oversimplifies the arguments of scholars like Ashar and Pio-
melli, but it captures some truth.
25. See Paul R. Tremblay, Acting “A Very Moral Type of God”: Triage Among Poor Clients, 
67 Fordham L. Rev. 2475 (1999) (developing a division-of-labor proposal for poverty law 
institutions).
26. Alizabeth Newman, Bridging the Justice Gap: Building Community by Responding to 
Individual Need, 17 Clinical L. Rev. 615, 635–36 (2011); see also April Land, “Lawyering 
Beyond” Without Leaving Individual Clients Behind, 18 Clinical L. Rev. 47, 59 (2011).
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legal services,27 we see that offering services to Soyoung would satisfy 
many of the principles involved. Applying Glenn Cohen’s “rationing prin-
ciples” scheme, the “best outcomes,” “aggregation,” and “instrumental” 
factors28 all would support assistance to a prospective client whose long-
term success would decrease needs in the future and offer some likely 
improvement in the lives of others beyond the client served. By contrast, 
aiding Gillian fares far less well in that kind of scheme.
To be sure, this work is, to use Barbara Bezdek’s phrase, “small-ball.”29 
It does little, and certainly nothing “serious,” to “challenge the hegemony 
of liberal capitalism.”30 But it makes some modest progress to “reconstruct 
legal-political lessons of inner-city advocacy and organizing in alliance 
with the communities [the lawyers] serve.”31 And that’s not a bad thing.
27. See I. Glenn Cohen, Rationing Legal Services, 5 J. Legal Analysis 221 (2013); Rich-
ard Zorza, The Access to Justice “Sorting Hat”: Towards a System of Triage and Intake that 
Maximizes Access and Outcomes, 89 Denv. U. L. Rev. 859 (2012).
28. Cohen, supra note 27, at 245.
29. Bezdek, supra note 21, at 16.
30. See note 18 supra.
31. Alfieri, supra note 8, at 1462.
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